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Abstract
This article argues that corporate law has become the legal platform upon which 
is erected a social process impeding society’s capacity to lucidly reflect on its pri-
mary ends; in this sense, corporate law is in conflict with social autonomy. This 
process is described here as a social feedback loop, in the structural centre of which 
lies the corporation which imposes its own purpose as an irrational social end, i.e. 
irrespective of its potentially catastrophic social consequences. The article argues 
that resolving the conflict between corporate law and social autonomy is impossible, 
because it presupposes a change of social paradigm towards one where corporate 
law as business organisation law has no obvious fit. This questions the social legiti-
macy of corporate law, signifies its non-permanence and thus opens up the field for 
seeking radical alternatives in the future.
Keywords Bureaucracy · Capitalism · Corporate law · Managerialism · Social 
autonomy
Part 1. Introduction
Even the keenest ‘black-letter’ admirer of existing laws would accept that social 
institutions ought to be open to change, in order to adapt to evolving social goals. 
However, adaptation is not always possible or at least as straightforward in practice, 
so that even radical action, such as the recent response to the coronavirus pandemic, 
may not have a lasting effect or may even exacerbate social hazards. Social insti-
tutions and their users can function as forces of inertia, so that society is unable 
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to effectively meet its challenges by redefining its ends. Institutions appear as if 
they have acquired a dominant agency of their own, even when inertia is socially 
hazardous.1
This article claims that what is currently regarded as standard corporate law has 
a role in the emergence and persistence of such an inertia problem in our society. 
Within capitalism, corporate law is a central institutional component of a ‘social 
feedback loop’—i.e. a self-reinforcing social process—by which the primary corpo-
rate purpose, namely wealth accumulation, is amplified and imposed upon society as 
a supreme and indisputable social end. The mechanics of this loop are fairly simple. 
Firstly, as an extremely effective device for protecting corporate wealth and for pro-
moting organisational expansion, the basic anatomy of corporate law has found an 
unprecedented fit with the primary capitalist purpose of infinite wealth accumula-
tion. It has enabled business growth to the extent that economic activity is primar-
ily organised within and between private, manager-controlled bureaucracies.2 Thus, 
corporate law is the legal platform for the bureaucratisation of the economy. At the 
corporate level, bureaucratic organisation tends to suppress the questioning of objec-
tives. Therefore, once these are internally set by management, they are constantly 
reproduced by a feedback process within the corporate organisation. Secondly, due 
to its social dominance, the bureaucratic corporation externalises those privately-set 
objectives so that they are eventually elevated to social ones and this creates a wider 
social feedback loop. Corporate law is thus a legal structure for this social process 
which has become so pervasive that it hinders society’s reflective capacity in rela-
tion to its objectives. This capacity is the essential basis of social autonomy, since an 
autonomous society is founded on the recognition that social goals are endogenously 
fashioned and therefore subject to social scrutiny without predeterminations.
In other words, by providing the legal foundation for the proliferation of the 
bureaucratised business organisation, the structural core of the feedback loop, cor-
porate law serves as an institution rendering our society essentially heteronomous, 
i.e. a society founded on the belief that its primary ends are exogenously and eter-
nally determined. This way, material accumulation acquires eternal validity as a pri-
mary social end and its consequences are ignored or marginalised. Corporate law is 
thus inevitably in conflict with social autonomy and therefore it is a socially hazard-
ous institution.
On this basis and drawing from the theory on bureaucracy and Castoriadis’ social 
philosophy, this article argues that the social legitimacy of corporate law needs criti-
cal re-examination. While engaging in a detailed discussion of alternative organisa-
tional forms is beyond this article’s scope, the finding that corporate law is socially 
hazardous is in itself important: it sets the basic parameters for further research on 
how business organisation law can be radicalised, in order to dismantle the social 
2 ‘Bureaucracy’ refers to the organisation designed as a top-down hierarchical decision-making and 
accountability structure.
1 The persistent denial of the trade-off between economic objectives and social sustainability or the inad-
equacy of respective action illustrate this problem (Hoffman and Ventresca 1999; af Rosenschöld et al. 
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feedback loop presented here and sustain social autonomy. The discussion will pro-
ceed as follows. The next Part will examine the role and organisational impact of 
corporate law as a vehicle for business. The third Part will analyse the social sig-
nificance of these organisational changes to argue corporate law is a socially hazard-
ous institution which reproduces social heteronomy by locking social ends within 
a capitalist frame. The fourth Part will explore the possibility of instituting social 
autonomy, as a social ideal, but show that corporate law in its current form can have 
no obvious place in a society organised on this basis. In the light of these findings, 
the concluding section summarises the basic parameters of future reform for restor-
ing the social legitimacy of business organisation.
Part 2. Corporate Law as the Legal Infrastructure of Large‑Scale 
Capitalism
That corporate law is a socially significant institution is revealed by its very long 
history. The short historical account which follows will show that its role has cer-
tainly changed over the centuries to reflect different organisational needs and social 
conditions, even if its basic anatomy has remained remarkably stable. However, 
what distinguishes the social function of corporate law within capitalism is that for 
the first time it is a fully private institution in respect of its purpose, its legitimacy 
and the interests it protects. This reconception has had a tremendous impact on busi-
ness organisation and the evolution of capitalism more generally.
Social Transformation and the Privatisation of Corporate Law
In one of the earliest historical accounts on the corporation, Williston (1888, p. 106) 
traces its origins initially in primitive associations of individuals who formed enti-
ties representing clans, tribes or families.3 In classical antiquity incorporated entities 
were used by groups of artisans or public contractors, and later by church organi-
sations, incorporated medieval guilds, municipalities, charities and hospitals. What 
Williston emphasises is that in most of their long history the role of corporate enti-
ties (and of corporate law) was of a purely public or quasi-public character. They 
had a wider social role—e.g. monasteries performed to a large extent the role the 
welfare state has today (Rushton 2001)—or served the purpose of regulating pub-
lic affairs, whether those were connected to professions, proximity of residence or 
activity, and so on. Even mercantilist companies conducted trade activities on behalf 
of the state and this made the distinction between markets and the state quite fuzzy, 
an important factor for their social legitimacy (Alborn 1998).4
3 See also Hansmann et al. (2006, pp. 1360–1361) discussing the Roman societates publicanorum.
4 Indicatively, the East India Company’s original charter granted by Elizabeth I was conditional on the 
venture being regarded as profitable for the Crown.
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Hence, incorporation in the pre-capitalist age was regarded as a scarce privilege 
and corporate charters were actively regulated by the state which required promoters 
to show their corporations served the public interest.5 With the advent of capitalism 
all this was to change. As Arnold (1937, p. 186) observes, this era is defined by ‘the 
prevailing ideal […] of the freedom and dignity of the individual engaged in the 
accumulation of wealth.’ This is known as the ‘capitalist spirit’, the principal force 
behind capitalism, which has been taken up by Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber 
and many others who have built on their works, in order to trace and explain its true 
origins. We will return to this later (see fourth Part below), but what matters in this 
instance is that, in spite of their divergence in other respects, all these strands agree 
that perpetual wealth accumulation as an end in itself is the dominant organisational 
principle and purpose in capitalist society.
As new social interests emerged carrying and being determined by the capital-
ist spirit, they also demanded the re-conception of existing institutions and of their 
relationship with the state. More specifically, business interests required an organi-
sational structure which could serve the attainment of infinite economic accumula-
tion by accommodating increasing scale and complexity. The old legal infrastructure 
based on trust deeds, contractual partnerships or agency law had served entrepre-
neurship well as long as business relationships were personal, localised and rela-
tively simple; they were institutions capable of organising small-scale, entrepreneur-
ial capitalism. However, such instruments proved inadequate for large business scale 
and for attracting investment capital from outside investors (Pearson 2002, p. 862; 
Taylor 2006, p. 17). So, business organisation law eventually had to turn capitalist 
by offering a legal structure for large, impersonal and complex business relations.
From an organisational perspective, the corporate structure was an ideal vehicle 
for large business. While this point will be analytically discussed below, for now 
it is sufficient to emphasise two things. On the one hand, incorporation facilitated 
the governance of distant and impersonal relations though the creation of a corpo-
rate pool of assets and the delegation of their management to professional directors. 
Legal recognition of the corporate person as the fictitious entity representing the 
common business purpose is crucial for this as it provides a fixed owner of busi-
ness assets and a reference point for corporate governance. On the other hand, it 
allowed theoretically limitless capital-raising with the issuing of shares as tradable 
instruments, while also offering investors protection from business risk beyond their 
control by limiting their liability in respect of corporate debt. As these elements had 
already been present in pre-capitalist corporations, there was no need to re-invent 
the wheel; the old corporate structure simply had to be privatised by being assigned 
to serve the purpose of private wealth accumulation.
Thus, by the mid-1800s, corporate legitimacy solely rooted in public or quasi-
public purposes had already come to an end. This demanded the abolition of the 
old regime of state-controlled corporate charters and the re-conception of the cor-
poration as a privately created and aimed institution. This privatised legitimacy of 
5 Monastic entities were somewhat exceptional in this respect as they were the ones that pioneered 
incorporation in Britain before the state began to exercise its control over it (Seymour 1903).
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the corporation inevitably became entrenched in Britain, the heartland of capitalism 
at the time, with the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the Limited Liabil-
ity Act of 1855. This legislation granted general incorporation rights to privately 
owned businesses and offered shareholders all the protection against business debt 
previously reserved for quasi-public entities. Both Acts were emblematic legislative 
attempts engrained in economic liberalism signifying the privatisation of corporate 
law in exchange for some disclosure requirements towards middle-class investors 
(Jones and Aiken 1995, esp. p. 69). The latter, thus, became the private enforcers of 
any remaining (social) scrutiny by being vested with the right to litigate misconduct 
(Keay 2014, pp. 92–96). In fact, a legal infrastructure of this type for the pursuit of 
the capitalist spirit was already in place in all major jurisdictions by the mid-1800s 
(Pistor et al. 2002, pp. 809–810).
In a nutshell, as the private economic sphere expanded, the privatisation of cor-
porate law followed as an inevitable consequence. Contrary to its treatment in other 
historical accounts as a symbol of (industrial) capital axiomatically (e.g. Ireland 
1996, p. 69; Talbott 2016; see also third Part below), the corporation is an ancient 
organisational form which is, nonetheless, radically adapted within capitalism, in 
order to serve private wealth accumulation as an overriding social objective whose 
prevalence is historically distinct. This reconception, however, has eventually led to 
further social developments, this time promoted, if not triggered, by corporate law.
Corporate Law (Anatomy) and Planned Capitalism
If the privatisation of corporate law through the liberalisation of the right to incor-
porate can be regarded as an outcome of social change, within capitalism it has led 
to further social transformation. The offering of the corporation’s organisational 
features to private business has transformed economic organisation, which is now 
predominantly ordered by corporate hierarchies and in bureaucratic terms to the 
extent that capitalism has evolved into something which is not too different from a 
decentralised and essentially privatised planned system; this is managerial capital-
ism. This section will focus on how corporate law has supported and promoted this 
capitalist mutation.
Crucial for this purpose is organisational scale and its association with manage-
rial empowerment. In this respect, Chandler’s (1977, 1990) historical exploration of 
the interaction between organisational growth and organisational mode has emerged 
as a standard source.6 He demonstrates how advances in transport and communica-
tions in the 1800s enlarged markets and created opportunities for business growth 
in scale and scope. This made mass production and diversification strategies pos-
sible for corporations via horizontal and vertical integration. With those strategies 
emerged a large multidivisional corporate form controlled by a professional manage-
rial bureaucracy with significant immunity from investor scrutiny. Berle and Means 
6 Even his critics focus on his interpretation of historical facts as an efficient transformation rather than 
on his descriptive accuracy (e.g. see Roy 1997).
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(1967) have shown how shareholders as collective owners of control rights were too 
diffuse and too detached to influence strategic decision-making.
As corporate controllers, managers pursued monopoly or oligopoly rents in satu-
rated markets by restricting competition through collusion, while they simultane-
ously created new markets by investing in new product development. Marketing and 
advertising divisions emerged as critical parts in this process by manipulating con-
sumer needs (Marcuse 1964), in order to create and maintain demand. Simultane-
ously, input costs were controlled via vertical integration and labour costs were con-
tained by the division of tasks which effectively de-skilled and commodified labour 
wherever necessary (Braverman 1998).
As a result, commodity, capital and labour markets were largely internalised 
by corporate hierarchies. Simultaneously, through their market share or oligopo-
listic collusion, managerial corporations were able to influence prices and market 
conditions. This has been empirically established since the 1930s (Hall and Hitch 
1939) and confirms Adam Smith’s (1976, pp. 754–755) aversion towards the cor-
poration as an anticompetitive arrangement; Chandler (1977) has described this as 
the replacement of the market by the managerial ‘visible hand’. Indeed, competition 
law has been historically ineffective in containing the concentration of economic 
power within corporate bureaucracies. For instance, once collusion via cartel agree-
ments became illegal, prohibitions were easily evaded via mergers and acquisitions 
(Licht 2014, p. 150) so that collusion was also internalised by the merged corpo-
rate bureaucracies. The effect has been a turn from the multidivisional incorporated 
bureaucracy towards the incorporation of divisions as subsidiaries hierarchically 
controlled by holding corporations (Zey and Camp 1996; Prechel 1997)7 and more 
recently to supply chain networks dominated by a small number of firms in each 
sector (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001; Witting 2019). Due to this ineffectiveness of 
competition law in controlling concentration, most markets have become predomi-
nantly oligopolistic; a trend that has accelerated since the 1980s (Autor et al. 2017; 
Griffin 2018; Kamerbeek 2010).8
So, with the rise of the managerial oligopolistic corporation, early entrepreneur-
ial capitalism, first in the US and later in other major jurisdictions (Chandler 1990; 
Hannah 1976),9 has mutated into today’s corporate capitalism, a society where 
markets are internalised and dominated by private (corporate) bureaucracies com-
manded by virtually unaccountable managers. Corporate controllers’ independence 
from internal and external pressures is a crucial aspect of this capitalist mutation. It 
8 On the dilemmas faced by regulatory authorities related to cartel versus merger control see LeClair 
(2011, esp. pp. 151–154).
9 For a more recent claim that the managerial corporation was already dominant in the UK by the begin-
ning of the twentieth century see Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012).
7 The validation of single-shareholder companies in English law since Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd 
[1897] AC 22, allowed the creation of subsidiaries relatively early (Chapman 1985). In the same fashion, 
initial prohibitions of holding companies in the US were gradually lifted in the 1880s (Butler 1985, pp. 
161–163). Regarding German corporate groups, Fohlin (2005, p. 228) reports that ‘in 1904, less than 1 
percent of [corporations] held nearly a quarter of the corporate capital stock’.
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is well recognised in organisation theory that managers’ autonomy unleashes their 
drive for endless expansion through organic growth and the acquisition of existing 
or potential competitors (Penrose 1959; Marris, 1998; Odagiri 2008).10 This fits per-
fectly with infinite accumulation as an end in itself. In other words, the managerial 
corporation is essentially a self-controlled and growth-oriented hierarchy designed 
to reproduce itself together with its own capitalist ideas.
Managerial autonomy and its effects have not even been contained by the restruc-
turing of financial markets and the economy more generally towards financial capi-
talism, since the mid-1970s. Financialisation has certainly instigated significant 
organisational changes in business organisation. On the one hand, it has increased 
the weight of profit opportunities from asset-price speculation as opposed to produc-
tion investment (Dore 2008; Epstein 2005; van der Zwan 2014; Tori and Onaran 
2018). On the other, it has enhanced the role of investor interests, as the reform of 
savings systems and their investment in securities markets has concentrated share 
ownership in the hands of institutional investors and speculators like hedge funds.11 
Thus, corporate control rights are more tangled with stock market speculation and 
expectedly managerial corporations are more inclined to emphasise the importance 
of share valuation in their decision-making. However, this is not a sign of managers’ 
surrender to external investor pressure.
Instead, corporate bureaucracies have emerged as dominant financial players in 
sync with other financial speculators. They are actively involved in securities mar-
kets by way of mergers and acquisitions involving competitors as well as by profi-
teering from financial speculation directly.12 Managers, especially at the top, rather 
than being more constrained, have also found a great opportunity in the financialised 
economic environment, as they can use the stock market to increase their own pay, 
while they also increase pay-outs to shareholders at the expense of labour interests 
(Appelbaum et al. 2019; Dünhaupt 2013). They do so by expanding the weight of 
their share-based remuneration and simultaneously manipulating share prices with 
extensive share-repurchase programmes (Lazonick 2013; Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006), and by brokering deals in the market for corporate control for which they 
(and shareholders) get heavily rewarded. Thus, if certain observers initially claimed 
that managerial control would eventually be dismantled and disappear (Jensen 
1989), corporate managers have been able to simply align corporate (and their own) 
goals with the financialised mode of wealth accumulation (Boyer 2005; Froud et al. 
2006). What may distinguish early corporate capitalism from its financialised mode 
is related to the method of economic accumulation—financial speculation has been 
added as a growing component to wealth accumulation based on mass produc-
tion—and the distribution of costs (primarily to wage earners) and benefits (asset 
owners). Both modes, however, remain equally faithful to the leading principle of 
10 See also Guglera et al. (2012) linking merger waves to managerial incentives.
11 This shift is more noticeable in the US and the UK, but similar trends are also noticed elsewhere 
including social-market economies as that in Sweden (OECD 2018).
12 Indicatively, Apple Inc. owns what is effectively the world’s largest investment fund, Braeburn Capi-
tal, managing financial assets worth over 250 billion US dollars.
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infinite accumulation as an end in itself (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007; Boltanski 
and Esquerre 2016) and the managerial corporation retains its position as the pri-
mary structure through which this principle materialises.
Thus, modern business practice is typified by the expanding dominance of pri-
vate incorporated bureaucracies which are largely unconstrained by what is com-
monly understood as the ‘market mechanism’ either in financial or input and output 
markets. That being so, some predominantly post-modernist organisation theorists 
have tried to balance the lack of extra-organisational (i.e. market) pressure on the 
managerial corporation with what they see as intra-organisational constraints. They 
emphasise the increasing need for independent ‘knowledge-workers’ as a challenge 
to manager-controlled hierarchies, which may lead to a post-bureaucratic era defined 
by organisational methods like project-management and semi-autonomous units 
(Adler 2001; Fenwick et al. 2019).13 However, empirical scrutiny has exposed that 
such techniques are simply tighter reformulations of hierarchical control relying on 
the same principles of accountability and surveillance found in traditional hierar-
chies (Diefenbach and Sillince 2011; Vie 2010; Courpasson and Clegg 2006). Thus, 
the twenty-first century capitalist organisation remains as bureaucratic as that of the 
previous century, if not more so. In this sense, corporate capitalism has essentially 
evolved into an economic system operating according to a decentralised but coordi-
nated plan primarily devised by private bureaucratic organisations run by managers 
with minimal outside constraints. Hence what is commonly referred to as ‘free-mar-
ket’ capitalism is a gross misdescription and as real as a unicorn.14
The contribution of corporate law to this transformation by which the entre-
preneurially controlled firm is replaced by bureaucratised oligopolies has been 
immense. Without the essential anatomy of standard corporate law all this would 
have been impossible. More specifically, focusing on the effective implementation of 
what they call ‘asset partitioning’ Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) have explained 
the importance of corporate personality and shareholder limited liability as protec-
tive devices for the corporate entity’s wealth (‘entity shielding’), on the one hand, 
and for its investors (‘owner shielding’), on the other. They argue very thoroughly 
how for large-scale business corporate law, as a form of property law rather than 
contract law, is necessary for instituting effectively the defensive protection of the 
corporate entity’s assets from those who control it or from third parties. Without the 
creation of the fictitious corporate person by operation of the law, asset partitioning 
would be impossible to enforce against third parties and thus incorporation would be 
pointless. Ironically, the privatisation of corporate law is now mirrored by the cor-
porate person being offered protection at the highest-level through constitutional law 
(Grear 2006; Greenwood 2017); this demonstrates how entrenched the corporation 
has become within capitalism.
13 This misconception by organisational theorists also (mis)led prominent legal theorists to speculate 
that new business necessities could transform capitalism into a de-bureaucratised, network-based and 
inclusive system reflecting the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ (e.g. Unger 2019).
14 On this point see also Crouch (2011) and Hamel and Zanini (2016). In fact, managerial employment 
never stopped increasing, even since the 1980s, the era when downsizing and de-bureaucratisation strate-
gies were supposed to dominate (Gordon 1996; Goldstein 2012).
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The legal ascertainment and fortification of the corporate pool of assets is funda-
mental for the rise of the bureaucratic corporation, since it offers the proprietary cer-
tainty required for enlarging corporate wealth without the risk of misappropriation. 
Simultaneously, this legal certainty assists in the exploitation of corporate assets for 
increasing financial liquidity—e.g. via direct borrowing or securitisation—in order 
to generate and exploit further profit opportunities. It also facilitates the retention 
and re-investment of profit that has been instrumental in the growth of the manage-
rial corporation. Relatedly, the perpetuity of the autonomous corporate person also 
matches perfectly the idea of infinite accumulation, because it disentangles the lat-
ter from the limitations imposed by the finite human life. Additionally, corporate 
personality combined with shareholders’ limited liability provide the legal basis for 
liability management by holding companies through risk externalisation and regula-
tory arbitrage (Muchlinski 2010; Tweedale and Flynn 2007). This has been instru-
mental in the expansion of corporate group activity nationally and internationally. 
Thus, by allowing the transformation of business parts into incorporated divisions 
(subsidiarisation), corporate law supports endless accumulation not only in a tempo-
ral and quantitative, but also in a geographical sense. Simultaneously, limited liabil-
ity is also facilitative of expansion, organically or via acquisitions, as it allows equity 
investors to shield themselves from business risk beyond their control—i.e. from the 
cost of large scale—both directly and via diversification (Blair 2003, p. 439).
More importantly for the current historical moment of capitalism, asset partition-
ing has also allowed the managerial corporation to adapt to the demands of finan-
cialisation. What Ireland (2010) has dubbed as the ‘reification’ of the corporation 
facilitates the dismantling or combination of business parts as subsidiaries which 
themselves can be treated as standalone assets. Relatedly, the emergence of the 
share as an autonomous tradable asset,15 a feature concomitant to the recognition of 
the corporate person, is perfectly aligned with the asset price-based accumulation 
regime of financialisation. By making possible the tradability of shares (Hansmann 
et al 2006, p. 1361), corporate personality is a sine qua non for the market for corpo-
rate control, and an essential element of financialised capitalism.
Additionally, the governance features of the corporation are also finely tuned with 
and supportive of unbounded wealth accumulation. Blair (2003, pp. 433–434) has 
highlighted the importance of vesting decision-making with a board of directors as 
an entity-shielding feature via directors’ accountability towards the corporate person 
as such.16 This point becomes particularly important in large manager-controlled 
corporations where the board acquires primacy in defining and pursuing the cor-
porate person’s interests condensed in the legal notion of the corporate objective.17 
This is a theoretically and doctrinally divisive notion in corporate law scholarship, 
15 For a detailed historical account see Ireland (1996).
16 Indicative of corporate law’s approach towards board autonomy is that directors’ duties enforcement is 
essentially hindered both procedurally and practically (e.g. Reisberg 2007).
17 The objective is essentially tied to the promotion of the company’s success as a going concern (e.g. 
Keay 2011, p. 10; Dignam and Galanis 2009, pp. 57–60); see also Attenborough (2009) on an alleged 
doctrinal closure since the introduction of s.172 of the Companies Act 2006.
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first, due to the question whether the corporate objective ought to include social con-
cerns in some way, and, second, due to its open-ended and malleable legal nature. 
The latter is no coincidence as the objective’s open-endedness assigns its ultimate 
formulation to the corporation itself and, more specifically, to whoever controls it. 
We have seen that before the corporation’s privatisation these issues were more or 
less settled by the imposition of the public interest by the state as ultimate control-
ler. However, within corporate capitalism the corporate objective is internally deter-
mined by managerial hierarchies with very little outside control as shareholders 
are rather passive monitors (Cheffins 2009). In this context then it should be seen 
primarily as an entity shielding device against outside interference with managerial 
autonomy. The latter is further strengthened by the formulation and judicial appli-
cation of the law governing business judgment, which generally precludes ex-post 
scrutiny (McMillan 2013; Keay 2006; Deipenbrock 2016). The only differentiation 
one could make as to how the objective is applied is that, compared to others, in 
financialised corporations shareholder interests and accumulation through asset-
price speculation may carry more weight in decision-making compared to other 
objectives (Boyer 2000; Mitchell 2001; Jürgens et al. 2002; Stockhammer 2006).
Overall, the privatisation of corporate law has been a precondition for the emer-
gence of bureaucratic capitalism. By protecting corporate wealth and enabling the 
organisation of large business it serves the purpose of limitless accumulation very 
successfully; corporate law is the essential legal infrastructure for the bureaucratic 
corporation. However, the social consequences of corporate law’s privatisation are 
much deeper and wider. These are explored next.
Part 3. Structuring the Social Feedback Loop: Corporate Law as Social 
Hazard
Having demonstrated the contribution of corporate law to the bureaucratisation of 
capitalism, we will now turn to assessing the broader impact of this transformation. 
We will show how corporate law has enabled business organisation to reproduce the 
capitalist spirit to the point where social transformation is now severely hindered 
by the social structure. To explain this point an appraisal of the essential features of 
bureaucratic organisation is important.
While bureaucracy is an ancient form of organisation, it is only within capitalism 
that it became a subject of inquiry with Hegel (1976, paras. 287–297) being the first 
to discuss its role and character. His focus was on public administration (he wrote 
prior to the privatisation of corporate law) which in his view has a positive social 
role as a mediator between the private and public interest. However, he recognised 
that extensive division of labour carries the risk of bureaucrats losing sight of their 
social role.18 This observation by Hegel had great potential for understanding the 
extensive social impact of bureaucratisation and was taken up much later by Weber. 
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However, Hegel himself did not expand on it and simply suggested ethical training 
and social accountability as remedies without being much more specific. As a result, 
Hegel’s concise analysis has had little influence on modern theory of bureaucracy.
At best, it inspired Marx’s brief critique of Hegel in his early works19 where 
bureaucracy within capitalism is presented as an instrument of domination used by 
the capitalist class to guarantee its property rights and, thus, exercise its dominance 
over the working class. In this sense, he treated both state and corporate bureaucra-
cies similarly. However, as Krygier (1985) observes, Marx’s treatment of bureau-
cratic organisation created insurmountable difficulties for his theoretical adherents 
who could not explain Soviet bureaucracy’s autonomous power without resorting 
to paradoxical or contradictory claims; state bureaucrats could not be a social class 
with independent interests and this contradicted the central Marxist tenet of strug-
gle between capital and labour. In the context of capitalism, this limitation equally 
applies to corporate bureaucracies, as Marxist theory cannot explain manage-
rial autonomy from capital ownership as managers do not fit neatly into capital or 
labour. It seems Hegel’s intuition about bureaucrats’ propensity to diverge from their 
socially designated role was probably correct; it allowed for bureaucracy’s autono-
mous agency.
Weber was the first to offer a systematic account of bureaucratic organisation and 
in a way he reconciled the Hegelian concern about bureaucrats’ social conscience 
with the instrumentality point of Marx. He did this by constructing his ‘ideal type’ 
of bureaucracy as an analytical tool for organisational practice and by assessing the 
wider social impact of its widespread use within capitalism. His departure point was 
that large organisational size is essentially associated with bureaucratisation (Weber 
1978, pp. 221 and 224; also Dimock and Hyde 1940, p. 36), which explains how 
corporate capitalism has emerged as predominantly bureaucratic. As organisational 
scale increases, personal relationships wane and are replaced as a source and form 
of ordering by an impersonal hierarchical order. Similar claims have been made by 
Simon (1976) who finds that large scale and complexity require a hierarchical organ-
isation based on a centralised objective-setting at the top and decentralised opera-
tional decision-making through delegation and division of tasks at levels below.
For Weber(ians)—Hegel and Marx would also agree—bureaucratic organisation 
is grounded on two fundamental and related principles: technique and domination. 
The former principle refers to managerial expertise in devising ‘rational’ procedural 
techniques and rules for the pursuit of bureaucratic goals, which are impersonal 
and independent of other norms that are incompatible with bureaucratic rational-
ity. Managerial tacit knowledge increases efficiency, but at the same time manage-
rial expertise denotes a shift of control towards the highest ranks of managers. In 
Weber’s own words, ‘[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally domina-
tion through knowledge’ (1978, p. 225). The second principle, domination, is the 
disciplinary effect of managerial techniques—primarily through the definition of 
tasks and objectives as well as through the manipulation of incentives (Edwards 
1979, esp. pp. 128–129 and 148–149)—upon those employed in the bureaucracy, 
19 See Marx (1970) and Marx and Engels (1974).
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who may not share the same goals as those set for their organisation. Thus, bureau-
cracy is fundamentally an effective incentive alignment instrument for the achieve-
ment of hierarchically set goals (Weber 1978, p. 990).
Expectedly, the recognition by Weber of bureaucracy’s potential power over indi-
vidual social agency has generated an immense literature comparing his efficient 
‘ideal type’ with organisational reality. So, some (e.g. Bigley and Roberts 2001; du 
Gay 2000) have celebrated bureaucracy’s organisational effectiveness, while others 
(e.g. Dugger 1980) have emphasised its tendency to diverge from the Weberian ideal 
due to various dysfunctions that allow personality traits (expressed as status seeking, 
inner circles, personal favours etc.) to affect organisational efficiency. However, even 
such critics accept the power of bureaucracy over the individual’s mode of rational-
ising the world which promotes instrumental reasoning over social conscience (Mer-
ton 1940).
In fact, this prevalence of instrumental rationality is the very reason for Weber’s 
own misgivings about capitalist bureaucratisation. He regarded bureaucracy as una-
ble and unsuitable for tackling the political question of social ends (Weber 1978, p. 
266 et seq.). In this regard, he was very careful in distinguishing practical rationality 
from substantive rationality. The former refers to instrumentality, while the latter 
is concerned with the ‘rationalisation’20 of action on the basis of unverifiable value 
postulates.21 As Kalberg (1980, p. 1156) notes, when it comes to systematising 
action in certain or all life-spheres, such as family, religious, professional life and 
so on, ‘a radical perspectivism prevails in which the existence of a rationalization 
process depends on an individual’s implied or stated unconscious or conscious pref-
erence for certain ultimate values’. Different individual and social substantive ration-
alities can easily coexist within the same social–historical moment, even if they 
have to compete against each other. So what is to be instrumentally pursued by the 
Weberian bureaucracy is to be determined independently and outside of it through 
a substantively rational social function, i.e. by politics. Thus, Weber (1978, p. 222) 
was careful enough to point out that ideally at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy 
‘there is an element that is at least not purely bureaucratic’. Otherwise, bureaucratic 
domination over social agency can turn the ‘precision instrument’ into a social haz-
ard.22 This is encapsulated in Weber’s renowned ‘iron cage’ metaphor describing the 
prevalence of instrumental rationality (for the pursuit of economic acquisition) as a 
result of expanding bureaucratisation in modern society;23 Weber had the hindsight 
of the managerial corporation that Marx or Hegel did not.
20 This term is in inverted commas here is because, for Weber, substantive rationalisation is never based 
on transcendental, universal or absolute values; values are not scientifically demonstrable, but grounded 
on plain individual and thus social belief in them.
21 Kalberg (1980) offers a thorough review of the use of the concept of rationality in Weber’s writings.
22 In a more recent critique, Graeber (2015) discusses bureaucracy’s irrationality as an organisational 
mode fostering ‘stupidity’.
23 Weber (2005, p. 123) used the term to describe the capitalist order which ‘is now bound to the techni-
cal and economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all the individu-
als who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with 
irresistible force’. For a recent analysis on the meaning of the Weberian ‘iron cage’ see Douglass (2016).
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Accordingly, Hibou (2015, p. 24 et seq.) focuses on the process of abstraction 
as a necessary function of bureaucratic organisation. She explains how the exten-
sive use of aggregated and quantified information in order to devise standardised 
rules, practices and targets requires and simultaneously leads to the proliferation of 
arbitrary abstraction. This (otherwise necessary) form of organisation constructs an 
artificially static ‘reality’, in order to deal with uncertainty and contingency in the 
governance process. Governing by aggregation and quantification enables commu-
nication between governors and governed through providing a set of stable refer-
ence points. But once those are instituted, the illusion of stable certainty also leads 
the organisation to forget their artificiality and arbitrariness as constructed ‘reali-
ties’. The result is a ‘closure of minds’ that can lead to tunnel vision and, as such, 
stifle reflexive evaluation of established practices, goals or standards. In addition, 
anything that is not measurable and quantifiable is of lesser or no importance in 
the governance process, so that substantive rationality is subjected to instrumental-
ity. Similarly, Castoriadis (1997a) critiques bureaucracy on the basis that, instead 
of merely closing meaning, abstraction ultimately destroys meaning completely.24 
It does so by reducing qualitative differences and social relations into quantitative 
ones, so as to eventually produce a measurable value, most preferably in monetary 
terms, in order to facilitate hierarchical dominance. But this value has no meaning 
whatsoever beyond a specific irrational belief in its actual validity and usefulness. 
More explicitly, it has no meaning beyond serving the unverifiable and, thus, irra-
tional goal of economic accumulation.
What is concerning in relation to bureaucratic domination within corporate capi-
talism is that, as we saw in the second Part above, the managerially-controlled cor-
porate bureaucracy is not simply instrumentally managing, even imperfectly, the 
implementation of goals set through processes outside of it, as Weber would have 
liked. On the one hand, the managerial corporation implements the principle of infi-
nite accumulation to perpetuate its own existence in accordance with the capitalist 
spirit; managerial incentives’ growth orientation has already been mentioned earlier. 
Simultaneously though, due to its bureaucratic antagonism towards substantively 
rational goal-setting action, it is unable to reflect upon its own goals and radically 
alter them if necessary. In this way, it supports a feedback loop where economic 
accumulation requires instrumental reason and instrumental reason perpetuates eco-
nomic accumulation as a supreme value. Thus, corporate governance issues can only 
refer to the corporate hierarchy’s instrumental efficiency in achieving this otherwise 
unverifiable value to the point of irrationality. All this is all too familiar in the con-
text of empirical corporate governance scholarship. It explains, for instance, the non-
resolvability of the corporate valuation problem and the impossibility of treating the 
share price as an accurate reflection of the ‘real’ economic value of production; all 
these values actually produced are simply arbitrary and fictitious constructions of 
24 On this point see also Murphy (2014) and Graeber (2018). Bureaucratic meaninglessness is now 
widely perceived in the workplace. Indicatively, a recent public survey by YouGov (2015) has revealed 
that 37% of working adults in the UK thought their job made no meaningful contribution to society, with 
another 13% not knowing whether their job did or did not.
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a particular belief system, and are simply accepted as ‘real’ by investors and man-
agers as a social fact (Haiven 2011). This may fit nicely with the ‘rationalisation’ 
of the governance process within the framework of economic positivism, but it is 
absolutely nonsensical beyond it; it is equivalent to organising by (self-)deception 
(Murphy 2014).
Certainly, this feedback loop of economic instrumentality would be of limited 
importance, if it was simply contained within the boundaries of business organisa-
tion. The ‘iron cage’ of instrumental rationality would not have a generalised impact 
on society’s substantively rational deliberation and would simply reduce such corpo-
rate logic to one of many competing value systems. However, within corporate capi-
talism we also have the subversion of this social process for two reasons. Firstly and 
more obviously, the larger the number of people participating in and being governed 
by corporate bureaucracy, the larger the social influence of the latter’s logic. Indeed, 
within corporate capitalism labour markets are predominantly organised in bureau-
cratic terms, which is not surprising given the economic dominance of the mana-
gerial corporation (Jacob 2004; also Hamel and Zanini 2016). Secondly, the social 
power of the latter is also exerted through its extensive channels of influence over 
policy and culture. The literature demonstrating the excessive levels of large corpo-
rations’ socio-political power is immense and need not be reiterated here.25 What is 
noteworthy, though, is that more recently corporate influence has reached extraordi-
nary levels with the use of internet technology for the generation and analysis of ‘big 
data’ by which even the most private spheres of human agency are placed at the ser-
vice of corporate profitability. This type of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff 2015) 
is a supercharged form of accumulation which relies on using personal data for pre-
dicting and modifying human behaviour in ways that make traditional mass produc-
tion marketing practices appear as totally innocent and ineffectual. Thus, through 
these two channels of social dominance operating simultaneously at both micro and 
the macro level, the managerial corporation imposes its (ir)rationality not only upon 
itself, but also upon society as a whole. This is of utmost importance from a social 
goal-setting perspective: the internal feedback loop of corporate bureaucracy, which 
rationalises corporate action through the dogma of economic accumulation, inevita-
bly emerges as a social feedback loop.26
This underlies the persistence and intensification of the capitalist spirit over the 
past two centuries and its further amplification more recently within the financial-
ised version of corporate capitalism. It also explains the conformist character of 
regulatory reform in response to the global financial crisis a decade ago and, more 
25 For a review see Hillman, et al. (2004). On the primary channels of corporate political influence see 
Barley (2007) and Sitkoff (2002). For a claim that corporations have now assumed public functions so 
as to become political agents see Crouch (2011) and Scherer et al. (2014); see also Maclean et al. (2010) 
for an empirical study confirming the social power of small corporate elites in the form of material and 
symbolic domination.
26 This conclusion is at odds with Crouch’s (2011) conclusions contemplating that social critique of cor-
porate activity can have a real impact. The argument here is that the impact of social critique on corpo-
rate reform is significantly stifled by the social feedback loop of bureaucratic capitalism.
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importantly, to the intensifying ecological crisis.27 The bureaucratised private cor-
poration and the financial interests attached to it have become the stratum carry-
ing, instituting and legitimising economic rationality as the ultimate, unquestionable 
social value system. The same phenomenon is described by Habermas as the ‘colo-
nisation of the world’28 by bureaucratic power, effectively denoting the subjugation 
of Weberian value-based rationality to economic instrumentality in a way that limits 
critical reflection about values at the individual and social level. In this logic, every 
aspect of social life can be reduced to quantifiable, monetised values ready to be 
used for the purposes of economic accumulation. This sustains the spirit of capital-
ism but also entrenches the corporation’s central role in the feedback loop of eco-
nomic rationalisation, because it prevents non-conforming and incompatible value 
postulates from arising even outside the corporate boundaries. Substantive rationali-
sation is not simply subjugated, but suppressed due to its incompatibility with cor-
porate logic. Thus, social space is created for the capitalist spirit to expand through 
the generation of a growing number of reductionist postulates like those in empirical 
corporate governance literature mentioned earlier in this discussion.
As a result, economic accumulation emerges as the ultimate and unchallenge-
able social value to the extent that society cripples its capacity to reflect upon and 
re-determine its instituted ends in spite of their irrationality and hazardous conse-
quences.29 In other words, the social feedback loop of corporate capitalism is one 
of social heteronomy where deterministic economic logic appears to be the most 
prevalent way of rationalising social action. Its structural core, corporate law and the 
business organisation erected upon it, renders the capitalist spirit a structural con-
cern as opposed to a mere spiritual one. This structural centrality of corporate law 
also makes its radical reform unlikely without prior social change signified by the 
prevalence of another spirit. To the extent corporate law impedes such change, it is a 
socially hazardous institution and, thus, its legitimacy is lost.
27 The thorough review of corporate law evolution by Johnston (2017) clearly demonstrates the conform-
ist nature of legal reform, which increasingly excludes societal concerns by focusing managerial account-
ability on the prioritisation of financial (shareholder) interests. Similarly, the soft approach towards 
engagement expectations from institutional shareholders with otherwise pressing environmental concerns 
in the UK Stewardship Code 2020 can also be explained by prevailing economic rationality (Katelouzou 
2019). In fact, the judiciary too seems to have internalised the capitalist spirit as illustrated by the High 
Court ruling in R (on the application of People & Planet) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3020 Admin. I 
am indebted to one of the journal referees for this point.
28 Habermas (1984, pp. 154 and 196) describes the process as one where ‘economic and bureaucratic 
spheres emerge in which social relations are regulated only via money and power’. Similarly, in his influ-
ential critique Marcuse (1964) focused on the rise of the consumerist culture driven by the preference 
manipulation strategies of the oligopolistic corporation as a social control mechanism imposing the capi-
talist spirit of irrational accumulation.
29 Discussing the hazards of capitalist accumulation is beyond this article’s scope. However, its irration-
ality is highlighted by Piketty’s (2014) discovery that even the narrow purpose of accumulation, namely 
social economic prosperity, is not achieved due to rising income inequality; the so-called ‘trickle-down’ 




Part 4. The Possibility of Autonomy and the Uncertain Future 
of Corporate Law
Thus far, we have questioned the legitimacy of corporate law within capitalism on 
the basis of its instrumental role in the bureaucratisation of business organisation 
which is now the platform for the social feedback loop imposing economic goals’ 
primacy as social ends. This ‘iron cage’ effect of corporate law inevitably indicates 
a very pessimistic prospect about social change. However, the following discussion 
will show how society cannot be eternally structured as an unbreachable cage of 
heteronomy by fully suppressing its reflective capacity. However, this also indicates 
that corporate law’s future as business organisation law is in no way guaranteed.
The Deeper Roots of Corporate Capitalism as the Path towards Autonomy
To explore the possibility of breaking out of the current heteronomous social set-
ting of corporate capitalism it will be necessary first to discuss in more detail how 
an autonomous society may emerge. Similarly to the emergence of capitalism in the 
first place, this would be a process of radical societal change which would neces-
sarily require the uprooting of the capitalist accumulation-orientated paradigm. 
Thus, the discussion will have to turn back to tracing the latter’s origins. As men-
tioned earlier, Smith, Marx and Weber provided seminal analyses upon which the 
three dominant theoretical approaches on the origins of capitalism have been built. 
Admittedly, the discussion of such important works could only be crude here and 
does not do justice to their complexity and eminence. It will be shown, however, that 
none of these threads can adequately explain the rise of capitalism as a radical social 
paradigm shift and thus fail to offer sufficient guidance on whether and how the het-
eronomy loop can be broken.
First, the perspective following Smith’s (1976, p. 25) early analysis attributes 
the drive for capitalist accumulation to human nature and thus considers its pur-
suit as naturally beneficial. There is a ‘propensity in human nature’, to use Smith’s 
own words, to engage in self-interested exchanges, in order to promote well-being 
through wealth accumulation; human nature is thus reduced to the homo-oeconomi-
cus. However, this ‘natural’ propensity cannot be easily reconciled with the emer-
gence of economic accumulation as a dominant ideal only relatively recently in 
human history. Nor does this proposition, so unreservedly adopted in economic the-
ory, offer a convincing basis for its explicit or implicit reference to the natural char-
acter of accumulation as a social purpose; it can only be accepted axiomatically and 
thus has no rational grounding (Hollander 1977). Founded on this axiom, Smith’s 
perspective cannot offer an explanation for social transformation towards or away 
from capitalism. At best it resorts to exogenous contingency and this is often the 
path followed by those adopting capitalism as a natural social ideal.
Thus, North and Thomas (1973) locate the roots of the capitalist spirit in popula-
tion growth which resulted in market expansion and profit opportunities. However, 
they do not explain why population growth initiated capitalism in eighteenth-century 
17
1 3
Corporate Law Versus Social Autonomy: Law as Social Hazard 
England, when it could have done so in the Netherlands where a more dramatic pop-
ulation growth was noted two centuries earlier (Wallerstein 1976, p. 276). Similar 
claims have been based on scientific knowledge expansion in the pre-capitalist era, 
but again scientific advances have been too linear to suggest a revolution in the strict 
sense and definitely not unique in history (Kearney 1964). So, even if the problem 
concerning the axiomatic nature of accumulation could be ignored, the contingency 
proposition also offers little in relation to explaining social paradigm shifts towards 
capitalism or any other social system. Additionally, another historical contradiction 
and irony is that among the initial carriers of the capitalist spirit were the private 
merchants around Smith’s time who organised their activities as private corporations 
(McNally 1990, p. 22 et seq.). This denies the very essence of free exchange, hence 
Smith’s hostility towards them and his accusation that they privatised and corrupted 
mercantilism (Muthu 2008, p. 185). This historical contradiction is of course even 
more pronounced now that capitalism is predominantly bureaucratic and the corpo-
ration is the primary structural pillar of capitalism.
On the other hand, the Marxist strand traces the capitalist spirit to the economic 
structure of feudalism and reduces it to a reflection of an oppressive mode of produc-
tion relations (Marx 1909; Brenner 1982). On this basis, there is little fundamentally 
wrong with accumulation as a (natural) social purpose provided it is socialised;30 the 
standard (but false) prediction of Marx was that this would happen inexorably. So 
for Marx(ists) the capitalist spirit is mostly an epiphenomenon of structural change 
from feudalism to capitalism to socialism on a naturally pre-determined path defined 
by a class struggle between the working and the capitalist class. This struggle is 
founded upon and ultimately determined by the economic structure of production 
relations and the commodification of labour (Meiksins Wood 2002, p. 96 et seq.). 
Even if the problem of Marxist historical determinism and its actual refutation by 
history itself could be ignored, the commodification of labour is not particular to the 
capitalist era; slavery certainly pre-dates it. Moreover, within corporate capitalism 
social classes are no longer those observed by Marx and different classes can have 
similar aspirations and vice versa. This has already been mentioned above in relation 
to the managerial class; corporate management without ownership rights over capi-
tal does not fit the distinction between capitalist and worker (Barbalet 1986; Graeber 
2014, pp. 74–75). One could add to this today’s wage-earners who are tomorrow’s 
pensioners and therefore interested in stock market returns or land and other asset 
prices. Thus, social change cannot be solely explained by class struggle and one 
would have to look elsewhere for its roots.
The Weberian strand is more open—though not without its own problems—as to 
the drivers of social change by referring to various social status groups as carriers 
of competing ideas (values) some of which may prevail depending on these groups’ 
relative social power (Wright 2005). It traces the origins of capitalism to the combi-
nation of technological with cultural factors (e.g. the ‘Protestant ethic’). However, 
scientific progress is of lesser importance in the emergence of capitalism, because 
30 Even Arrighi’s (1994, 2007) otherwise elegant analysis of capitalism suffers from this, as it ultimately 
proclaims state-controlled accumulation (Chinese-style) as a desirable social model.
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it is cultural factors that determine its uses (Weber 2005, at xxxvii); the emphasis 
is thus on the world of ideas. For Weber, capitalist accumulation is neither a natural 
state of affairs (as in Smith) nor a product of economic relations (as in Marx), but the 
consequence of a particular way of rationalising the world, which prevails over other 
competing rationalities. In fact, Weber’s major contribution in this respect is not so 
much his point on the relation between religion and social change, but his emphasis 
on how religious rationality gradually gave way to instrumental rationality (he called 
this the ‘disenchantment’ of the world) devoted to the perpetual pursuit of material 
wealth as the predominant characteristic of capitalism. However, as already men-
tioned and contrary to Marx’s optimism about social evolution, Weber’s sociological 
analysis of modern capitalism was quite pessimistic: rationalisation came with the 
proliferation of the bureaucratic ‘iron cage’ which would become so inexorable that 
only charismatic leadership outside of it could subject it to a substantively rational 
process of goal redefinition. History vindicates Weber’s first point, but by relying on 
charisma as a solution he offers little more than another contingency-based proposi-
tion. Charismatic leadership is not guaranteed and, even if it was, it could not ensure 
a desirable social order; Weber was aware of this problem but could not offer a satis-
factory answer (Dow 1978, p. 85).
In this respect Castoriadis’ (1987) theory of radical social paradigm shifts based 
on the concept of the social imaginary, not only responds to this problem in Webe-
rian theory, but also avoids the methodological difficulties and contradictions in the 
other perspectives described above. His basis is the individual and his emphasis is 
on the role of imagination, a human capacity that has either been ignored (e.g. in 
Cartesian rationalism) or rejected as distortive of truth (as in Aristotelian ethics) or 
subjected to some form of transcendental reason (as in Kant). The prominence of 
imagination in Castoriadis is more than justified. It is for some time now empiri-
cally established by cognitive science that human learning, reasoning and purposive 
action are entwined with the imagining capacity of the brain (e.g. Hesslow, 2012; 
Schacter 2012; Gaesser 2012; Stokes 2014; Leahy and Sweller 2008; Dolan 2002). 
On this evidence, ignoring, rejecting and subjugating imagination as a factor influ-
encing human action in traditional philosophy now seem outdated. Therefore, incor-
porating it in the study of social phenomena (the law included) has been long over-
due and this is exactly what gives currency and force to Castoriadis’ theory on social 
change and stability. However, as we shall see, this framework offers more than 
explanations, as it suggests the possibility of instituting social autonomy through 
a pure conception of democratic polity as a social ideal. Thus, it is not only helpful 
in explaining (corporate) capitalism’s emergence and appraising the social feedback 
loop’s ultimate force, but also offers guidance as to how such structures can be dis-
mantled and avoided in the future; this ticks all the boxes for our purposes here.
The starting point for Castoriadis is the subconscious and, in particular, its ability 
to create imaginary representations ex nihilo. This conception of human imagination 
recognises the psyche’s potential to do more than simply re-present external real-
ity that it then simply re-produces (Castoriadis 1987, p. 283). Castoriadis calls this 
psychical capacity the ‘radical imaginary’. This empirically proven cognitive pro-
cess (Brogaard and Gatzia 2017; Dijksterhuis and Meurs 2006; Dietrich 2004) is the 
source of radical novelty—creative ‘out of the box’ thinking—rather than the simple 
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re-interpretation or synthesis of already existing and pre-imagined ‘realities’ (Mod-
ell 2003).31 Interaction with the external world, i.e. perception, relies on imagination 
which interprets but also gives meaning to this experience. Ultimately the psyche 
creates its own imagined and therefore subjective representation of the world. It is 
perhaps accurate to compare this with the subjective understanding of the self and 
the world described by Weberian substantive rationality; both lead to an open-ended 
notion of rationality, so as to accommodate different images of the self.
Certainly, Castoriadis (1997b) does not disregard social conditioning and this 
creative process is ‘not in nihilo or cum nihilo’ (ibid., pp. 321–322).32 Due to an 
inherent tendency of the individual as a social being to internalise socially created 
representations of external reality, the psyche is always socially conditioned. For 
example, the individual socialised within capitalism will more or less resemble the 
homo œconomicus or some type of personality that fits within the capitalist structure 
so as to exist within this context. This is indeed the source of the social feedback 
loop’s power within corporate capitalism. Since, by its nature, corporate bureaucracy 
is a mechanism for confining meaning within the economic accumulation frame, it 
effectively restrains the creative capacity of the radical imaginary; its proliferation 
contradicts individual autonomy. To the extent, however, that this structural power 
is unable to fully determine the radical dimension of the subconscious, bureaucratic 
control can never be complete. There will always be a fault-line between the social 
feedback loop and the individual’s radical imaginary. Thus, imagining a different 
mode of being, even within capitalism, always remains a possibility which necessar-
ily begins from the individual social agent.
This battleground between socialisation and the radical imaginary is indeed, 
for Castoriadis, the driver of social change and what therefore created the capi-
talist spirit in the first place. He links what occurs at the individual level with the 
emergence of social order by tracing the latter’s roots in the former. It is from the 
creation of shared images of shared ‘realities’ arising from agents’ co-existence in 
space and time (the social–historical) that a society is instituted. This shared imagi-
nation of society’s individual members as an ‘anonymous collective’ (Castoriadis 
1997b, p.322) generates central significations—such as God, the economy, justice 
or capital—which do not refer to logic or actual reality, but have to refer to other 
things to signify how society thinks about them. So, within capitalism, capital has to 
refer to machines, land, work (human resources), shares or, more recently, personal 
data. Through such second order significations society gives meaning to everything 
else—e.g. wages, goods, profit, costs and so on—and is held together by referring to 
them. Thus, a society’s history-specific logic is ultimately determined by its central 
significations which are unverifiable creations of collective imagination, the ‘radi-
cal social imaginary’ (Castoriadis 1987, pp. 358–365). This, as Thompson (1982, 
31 See also Adams (2005, p. 35) referring to the transcript of a discussion on this point between Castori-
adis and Ricoeur.
32 As Castoriadis (1997b, pp. 321–322) explains, this psychical capacity is ‘an a-causal vis formandi. 
A-causal does not mean “unconditioned” or absolute, ab-solutus, separated, detached, without relations’. 
For more nuanced interpretations of the radical imaginary see also Adams (2005).
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p. 664) observes, creates central significations explaining ‘the orientation of social 
institutions, the constitution of motives and needs, the existence of symbolism, tra-
dition, and myth.’
In this creative process which institutes society, social praxis is of primary 
importance. Social agents’ spontaneous activity, even if mundane and not necessar-
ily revolutionary, often requires imagining the future and their position in it. From 
this inevitably originates an infinite creation of new significations (Joas and Meyer 
1989) which may not always be compatible with what is already instituted and such 
contradictions can instigate minor or wider changes. Certainly, social praxis occurs 
in various domains and among a variety of social groupings where different sig-
nificatory configurations may emerge. To the extent such groupings see themselves 
as belonging in the same society they will more or less share that society’s central 
logic, the dominant imaginary, and remain conformist. Indeed, the transition from 
entrepreneurial to corporate and financial capitalism can be explained in this way. 
However, even central significations are not immune from this process of constant 
flux. Social praxis does not exclude the existence and emergence of other radically 
different imaginaries carried to various degrees by particular social segments. So 
there is always a tension within the instituted society, which can eventually bring 
about radical social change as self-alteration even without clean breaks; Arnason 
calls this a ‘long revolutionary process’ (Arnason 2001, p. 157; also Ciaramelli 
1997). As all societies are subjectively self-instituted, they are also subjected to the 
forces of change endogenously.
Thus, capitalism can also be explained as the outcome of a particular accumu-
lation of such practice-driven reconfigurations of previous rationalities which gave 
rise to the capitalist imaginary. The roots of the capitalist spirit can indeed be traced 
in Weber’s verdict that, in the aftermath of the Enlightenment, the world was ‘dis-
enchanted’ following the retreat—even if not complete—of religious rationalities 
(Weber 1946, pp. 129–156; also Harrison 2017). This created a vacuum in relation 
to rationalising life’s finitude, which had to be filled by a phantasy of omnipotence 
expressed through the domination over nature. In this context, it did not take long 
until economic rationality became an elite project too, by which social salvation 
would be attained through the pursuit of material accumulation (Hirschman 1977). 
Indeed, this is what underlies Adam Smith’s optimism about economic develop-
ment and is recognised by Mill (1909, pp. 696–699); also Schmidt (2014) or even 
Marx as the driver of infinite economic accumulation, served by instrumental rea-
son; certainly this is Weber’s verdict too. All this can be attributed to the workings 
of the radical social imaginary which has instituted what Castoriadis calls ‘rational 
mastery’ as the central signification guiding capitalist society; he uses the terms 
‘pseudo-rational’ and ‘pseudo-mastery’ to denote its imaginary and unverifiable 
essence. However, this irrationality matters little, since central significations cannot 
have a rational basis anyway. It suffices that rational mastery has surpassed religion-
based salvation so that infinite material accumulation is promoted as a governing 
social end. As Benjamin pointed out almost a century ago, the emergence of the 
market or a market ethic as the ‘natural’ arbiter and calculator of social activity is 
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not too different from the metaphysical beliefs which were more prevalent in the 
pre-capitalist world.33 What does matter is that this social imaginary orientates our 
society, through the process exposed above, by referring and giving meaning in vari-
ous degrees to all other organisational aspects; an objectively rational basis is com-
pletely unnecessary for that to happen.
Indeed, Castoriadis’ major contribution in locating the roots of social fram-
ing in the workings of imagination, is that by doing so he has also opened the way 
towards radical reflection on institutional arrangements and thus towards promoting 
social change. If transformation towards bureaucratic capitalism can be explained 
as a product of social imagination, breaking the social feedback loop is also pos-
sible without having to resort to the nebulous concept of Weberian charisma. To 
the extent that the radical (social) imaginary is not constrained, capitalism just like 
any other previous social order, is also susceptible to incremental change resulting 
from mismatches between regular praxis and what is instituted. The more such fric-
tions accumulate, the higher the likelihood of generalised questioning of central 
significations.
Certainty, catalytic events, may even speed up and radicalise social change. For 
instance, in response to the global coronavirus pandemic, we have witnessed the 
unprecedented suspension of economic activity imposed by governments, in order 
to prioritise public health. Simultaneously, the private sector has been mobilised 
and quasi-nationalised with the substitution of private incomes by state subsidies 
(Partington 2020). This could signify a moment of radical departure from economic 
determinism and the supremacy of economic accumulation could be significantly 
challenged. However, even as such events have been unfolding, the forces of social 
inertia (and the social feedback loop) have not vanished: the corporate sector—espe-
cially big pharmaceutical companies—is still relied upon (and legitimised) as the 
potential saviour from the pandemic, while even wage subsidies could turn out to be 
a costly and disguised effort ensuring the survival of established economic rational-
ity. Also, rather striking have been the objections of powerful corporate interests 
to the prioritisation of public health over the economy, even as coronavirus fatality 
rates had been accelerating (Reich 2020). Thus, the possibility of a paradigm shift 
will ultimately depend on whether the epidemic’s social impact prevents a return to 
the servitude of the capitalist imaginary, once the possibility of sidelining economic 
accumulation in favour of another social end (e.g. public health) has already been 
experienced; this had previously been considered ‘irrational’ and impossible. How-
ever, the more exceptional a crisis, the more likely the response to it will also be 
regarded as exceptional. As such, this response may never become systemic, so that 
social inertia eventually prevails. Still, even if a radical shift away from the capital-
ist spirit and practice could indeed become a visible possibility after such dramatic 
events, the next and more important logical question is about the type of any new 
central signification(s) and its social desirability.
33 Benjamin (1996, p. 288) famously described the structure of capitalism ‘not merely, as Weber 
believes, as a formation conditioned by religion, but as an essentially religious phenomenon’.
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To answer this question, a vital distinction should be made here: while all socie-
ties are essentially and always self-instituted, they are not necessarily autonomous, 
as they tend to conceal their self-instituting capacity. This heteronomy arises when 
the instituted structure leads to a closure of meaning by suppressing the workings 
of the radical imaginary, as illustrated in the context of bureaucratic organisations 
(third Part above). Social heteronomy can be explained on the basis of a central 
imaginary representation postulating institutions which are based on a rationality 
presumed objective and extra-social; e.g. God’s will or the market logic as a natu-
ral law. This is when the relationship between society and its institutions is ‘turned 
upside down’, to use Castoriadis’ words, with the former serving the latter (Castori-
adis 1987, pp. 91 and 110).
The only remedy and defence against heteronomy is to institute society on the 
basis of what Castoriadis calls the central signification of autonomy. Effectively, this 
is a political call for a society that takes responsibility for and abides by its own 
rules, but only for as long as they serve its democratically selected goals by similarly 
self-reflective and actively responsible citizens in a ‘circle of creation’ (Klooger 
2012, pp. 91–92). So, if Weber’s hope for social emancipation rests with charismatic 
leadership, Castoriadis’ proposition is for a system of institutions promoting lucidly 
reflective, but necessarily democratic, practice as an enduring project of autonomy. 
Anchoring the radical social imaginary and its institutional manifestation within 
such a democratic process is the safeguard against the risk of charismatic leaders’ 
authoritarian subjectivism; not an unknown phenomenon these days.
The infinity of the project of autonomy is indispensable because, contrary to 
rational democratic deliberation à la Habermas (1996, pp. 287–328), for Castoriadis, 
social outcomes can never be ideal, even if they have emerged through a rational 
process; procedural rationality principles are also socially determined and value-
laden.34 All institutions can only be substantively rational and therefore arbitrary to 
the extent they are founded on unverifiable values which make them always open 
to radical revision. Social autonomy requires the acceptance of this type of open-
ness and its full enactment includes the revision of social deliberation processes too. 
Indeed, the social feedback loop problem presented above vindicates Castoriadis’ 
concern in that current democratic arrangements seem to struggle against corporate 
power.
The struggle for social autonomy, even in the aftermath of a pandemic or other 
crisis, is therefore twofold. On the one hand, it is for sustaining radical change 
against the tide of the social feedback loop of economic determinism for long 
enough. On the other hand, it is for ensuring that the new structure replacing the 
old will institute the central signification of autonomy. Unfortunately, the measures 
adopted in response to the pandemic (general lockdown with the suspension of fun-
damental freedoms) can hardly be reconciled with autonomy. This risks rendering 
the social feedback problem analysed in this article even more acute in the future.
34 On Castoriadis’ critique of Habermas’ rationality claim see Kalyvas (2001).
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On the basis of the normative position outlined above, the primary social legiti-
macy criterion for corporate law, as with any other institution, is its compatibility 
with autonomous reflective action. This open (in terms of corporate legitimacy), 
but quite prescriptive (in terms of method), criterion necessitates the undoing of 
the social feedback loop in order to resolve the conflict between corporate law 
and social autonomy. The question then is if corporate law can indeed accommo-
date this criterion.
To begin with, that in an autonomous society one would expect to find insti-
tutional arrangements promoting democratic deliberation on a substantively 
rational setting is unquestionable. In such a context, business organisation would 
be assigned to serve social purposes which are democratically set, without exer-
cising social agency independently of its individual participants. Essentially this 
presumes that business organisation ought to be non-bureaucratic, otherwise it 
would undermine individual agents’ reflective capacity and frustrate substantively 
rational deliberation within its decision-making and governance arrangements 
more generally.
Nonetheless, the analysis in the third Part above has exposed the impossibility of 
this within the setting of the managerial corporation and corporate capitalism. We 
have already established that the social feedback loop and its corporate law founda-
tion is a typical illustration of the inverted social arrangement where society exists 
to serve its institutions as corporate bureaucracy imposes its goals upon society. The 
re-imagination of corporate law through its privatisation as business organisation 
law is the root cause of this problem. Ultimately, through corporate law our soci-
ety has instituted and reproduces its own heteronomy. Even if not all corporations 
are managerial and bureaucratic, we have shown how, by its nature as a governance 
form, corporate law has an in-built propensity towards organisational growth, that 
is, a bureaucratisation tendency. As such corporate law is a mechanism for confining 
meaning within the economic accumulation frame and ultimately limits the creative 
capacity of the radical imaginary; it contradicts autonomy by reproducing the capi-
talist logic through its re-incarnations as a managerial structure. This is indeed its 
fatal flaw from the perspective of autonomy and in respect of its compatibility with a 
society instituted on the basis of that perspective.
Seen in this way, modern corporate law is simply an ideologically charged prod-
uct of our own society’s self-imposed imaginary. In other words, corporate law, the 
legal foundations of the social feedback loop, can only be explained and justified 
by adhering to the heteronomous capitalist logic and the ideology that follows and 
solidifies it. As observed by Lefort (1978, p. 296), ideology conceals the imagi-
nary nature of central significations through ‘the linking together of representations 
which have the function of re-establishing the dimension of society ‘without his-
tory’ at the very heart of historical society’. The significance of this is that it crys-
tallises meaning by making issues which are essentially social, political and there-
fore temporary look as if they are simply of a technical nature with little normative 
background (Thompson 1982, p. 672) and of eternal legitimacy. The proliferation of 
pseudo-scientific mathematical modelling in the justificatory framework for current 
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corporate law doctrine is simply another sophisticated tool concealing the ideologi-
cal roots of corporate law with a pseudo-scientific gloss (Chen and Hanson 2004).
Lifting this technocratic facade would simply reveal that corporate law is a deeply 
political instrument and would open the door towards re-subjecting it to political 
(i.e. democratic) deliberation about its use. Indeed, this way of treating corporate 
law could open the door to democratic reflection which could resolve its conflict 
with society. However, this re-politicisation would contradict its very nature as an 
institution serving private business interests, i.e. infinite private accumulation as a 
social end. After all, it was privatised in order to facilitate the supremacy of private 
economic interests over the public interest through reducing the latter to the former. 
If this subjugation has not been problematic within capitalism, its questioning is 
equivalent to doubting the very foundations of our society so long as it is guided by 
the capitalist imaginary. The more business activity diverges from what is regarded 
as the public interest (as it increasingly seems to be the case) the trade-off between 
business organisation and social objectives becomes more pronounced and this del-
egitimises the former. As mentioned above, the temporary suspension of capitalist 
accumulation could indeed instigate radical social reflection on the social role of 
corporate law, but inertia could yet again prevail after the pandemic’s containment; 
e.g. the focus could be targeted towards economic ‘rebuilding’ along conventional 
lines but with higher intensity. Indeed, the first signs of the feedback loop’s further 
entrenchment are already visible, as among the post-coronavirus reforms considered 
by the British government is the introduction of manager-friendly corporate insol-
vency rules (Partington and Stewart 2020).
If the legitimacy problem of business organisation is to be resolved, its governing 
law ought to take a radically different turn by imposing limits on the concentration 
of social power by private organisations outside and above the reach of democratic 
scrutiny.35 Otherwise, even if the social feedback loop’s force could be temporarily 
suspended by social crisis to allow for the emergence of a new social logic, corpo-
rate bureaucracy would at best mould it to fit its own interests (even if radically new) 
as another type of ‘iron cage’ or it could revert and re-impose the default business 
purpose of endless accumulation yet again. As explained earlier, the root of corpo-
rate law’s socially hazardous nature is its orientation towards accumulation which 
leads to increasing scale, bureaucratisation and the freezing of meaning in economic 
terms. Thus, one of the preconditions for engraving autonomy in the social structure 
is to socialise business organisation through the imposition of an organisational limit 
to its scale. This would dismantle the heteronomy loop by removing the dominant 
agency that business organisation currently has acquired, which subjugates social 
scrutiny. It would also prevent the colonising effect of business practice and ideol-
ogy outside of its strict limits in other sectors of public and private life. Business 
organisation would thus become more of a receiver of social significations and more 
adaptive to social purposes. What is clear from the analysis so far though is that 
corporate law as a structure for business organisation has no evident fit in a social 
35 This would also alleviate the problems faced by competition law, since a scale-constrained business 
organisation would be unable to attain a dominant position (see above notes 7–8 and text).
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context of this kind—its ‘legitimacy’ exists only in a heteronomous social setting. 
Therefore, the use of corporate law as business organisation law ought to be mar-
ginalised and replaced by structures respectful of autonomy. In fact, if a prediction 
can be made, this could be inevitable to the extent that capitalist accumulation has 
reached its natural limits and inexorably leads to societal adaptation towards a post-
growth era.36 This is indeed an insurmountable challenge to capitalist society’s cen-
tral signification, the phantasy of ‘mastery over nature’, whereas the coronavirus 
pandemic’s impact could also fertilise the ideological debate. However, more effort 
along the lines suggested in this Part will be necessary if social autonomy is to be 
instituted, so corporate lawyers’ social role is specific and significant.
Part 5. Conclusion
In spite of corporate law’s social impact discussed here, we have established that 
social paradigm change is after all inevitable, since our social order is subjected to 
the radical imaginary’s creative forces and therefore can never be eternally set. How-
ever, it matters little whether the heteronomy loop of corporate capitalism can be 
temporarily broken, if this breaking does not lead to an autonomous society and is 
replaced instead by some other heteronomous social arrangement. Thus, what mat-
ters most is that social focus and therefore academic effort should be on replacing 
the current relation between society and its structure with a different one instituting 
the principle of autonomy. Inevitably, within this frame our business organisation 
law ought to look very different to how it currently does and its legitimacy must be 
grounded on its capacity to accommodate self-reflection, rather than being based on 
some other ‘objective’ (ir)rationality.
As a first start in this direction, even if this is a painful process for corporate 
lawyers, we should acknowledge that corporate law’s social legitimacy has already 
been lost. From this acknowledgment begins the responsibility to re-envisage busi-
ness organisation law in radically different terms, if it is to cease being an insti-
tution of hazardous social inertia. The paradigm of social autonomy constitutes a 
good general guide in this process which undoubtedly will have to be dynamic and 
perpetual. Even if working out the detail of what business organisation law ought 
to be is beyond the endeavour of this article, the discussion above has revealed one 
major aspect of corporate law causing its legitimacy problem as a hazardous institu-
tion of heteronomy, namely its inherent orientation towards endless accumulation. 
Law reform in this area could then start by actively promoting the marginalisa-
tion of corporate law in the structuration of business organisation. Positive action 
along these lines could involve the promotion of non-corporate legal structures for 
non-hierarchical organisation which can accommodate autonomous agency bet-
ter. To the extent radical social change is at least imaginable (if not inevitable), the 
36 While influential studies like Gordon (2016) show GDP growth is anything but guaranteed, there is no 
doubt that environmental degradation resulting from economic activity has for some time now been gen-
erating increasing social movement pressures against the status quo (Rowell 1996).
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‘black-letter’ corporate lawyer (an increasingly imaginary figure) would then need 
to be prepared for the marginalisation of the private business corporation. Delaying 
this could eventually backfire as the increasing divergence between corporate and 
social interests may eventually take a more authoritarian or violent turn, and the 
coercive reaction to the coronavirus is not too promising.
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